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when the insured assigned his rights under the policy. Thus, it is still
unsettled in New York whether any such absolute "insurer-insured"
privilege does in fact exist. 100
The court then considered the availability of a conditional privi-
lege under CPLR 3101(d). The court found none, stating that "an
investigation conducted to defend an insured against a possible legal
action is not material prepared for legal action as against the insurer."u0'
The third department's interpretation is not without basis. In
Bennett v. Troy Record Co.,102 the court required an insurer to dis-
close materials prepared for prior litigations which involved accidents
similar in nature to that in which the plaintiff was injured. 03 And in
Colbert v. Home Indemnity Co., 10 4 the supreme court held that a
defendant-insurer could not prevent disclosure of materials which it
had gathered for a separate action against its plaintiff-insured.
The holding in the instant case is particularly sound because the
insurer disclaimed coverage in the action against its insured. How could
the insurer thereafter logically assert that the materials it possessed
were prepared for the defense of that litigation?
CPLR 3117(a)(3): Use of party's own deposition denied.
A party may not put his own deposition in evidence unless the con-
ditions of CPLR 3117(a)(3) are fulfilled.1 5 In Jobse v. Connolly,10 6
the court did not allow the plaintiff's deposition to be put in evidence
where he had been missing for six years and his attorney had not been
able to locate him. Judge Younger remarked that there is an implied
condition in CPLR 3117(a)(3) that the deponent's absence must not
be due to the act or neglect of the party offering the deposition. Since
the plaintiff's unavailability was a consequence of his own actions, a
100 The question of whether an absolute privilege should attach to an insured-insurer
relationship was raised in Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513, 515, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898,
901-02 (Ist Dep't 1965). 3 WK&M 3101.50b (1969) suggests that an absolute privilege
should not be extended to an insurer-insured relationship and that adequate protection
is afforded to the insurer by the conditional privilege.
101 32 App. Div. 2d 725-26, 300 N.Y.S2d 392 (3d Dep't 1969) (emphasis added).
10225 App. Div. 2d 799, 269 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sd Dep't 1966); see also 3 WK&M 3101.51
(1969):
[Mjn a suit by the insured against his insurer for failure to settle a case,
material prepared for related litigation is treated as if not prepared for the
case at bar. [Footnotes omitted.]
10 Cf. Linton v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 25 App. Div. 2d 834, 269 N.Y.S.2d 490 (3d Dep't
1966) (construing N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 47 (McKinney 1965)).
104 45 Misc. 2d 1098, 259 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965), af'd mem., 25
App. Div. 2d 1080, 265 N.Y.S.2d 893 (4th Dep't 1965).
105 3 WK&M 3117.04 (1969). See also 7B MCKINNEY'$ CPLR 3117, supp. commentary
119, 120 (1965).
106 60 Misc. 2d 69, 302 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1969).
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contrary result would have been unjust and would have contravened
both the express purpose of CPLR 104 and the general rule that a party
may not benefit from his own misconduct. Had the party-deponent
been too ill to attend trial 0 7 or had he died prior to the trial, 08 his
deposition could of course have been accepted as evidence.
The Jobse rationale therefore suggests that the "absence of the
witness due to a party's wrongdoing" principle in CPLR 3117(a)(3)(ii)
is applicable to all the provisions in CPLR 3117(a)(3) which permit the
use of depositions. That is, depositions of an absent witness will not
be admissible by a party who has purposefully created the conditions
causing his absence.
CPLR 3121: Doctor-patient privilege is waived if party's physical con-
dition is in controversy.
Ordinarily, when a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal
injuries, he waives the doctor-patient privilege and is required to dis-
close medical information under CPLR 3121.109 Similarly, a defendant
who counterclaims for personal injuries or who affirmatively defends on
the basis of his physical condition must disclose pertinent medical
materials.10 For example, in Fisher v. Fossett,111 the defendant waived
the doctor-patient privilege when she stated in both a report and an
examination before trial that she had blacked out at the wheel of her
car because of a coronary condition.
The doctor-patient privilege and disclosure under CPLR 3121
were recently examined by the appellate division in Koump v. Smith.12
In Koump, the plaintiff was injured when the defendant drove across
a highway divider and crashed head-on into the plaintiff's car. The
complaint alleged that at the time of the accident the defendant was
intoxicated and this circumstance caused the collision; the answer
denied these allegations. Pursuant to CPLR 3121, the plaintiff served
107 See Wojtas v. Fifth Ave. Coach Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 685, 257 N.Y.S.2d 404 (2d
Dep't 1965) (court accepted deposition of defendant who had suffered coronary throm-
bosis).
108 See Wank v. Herman, 2 App. Div. 2d 867, 156 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 1956) (ad-
ministrator permitted to read deceased plaintiff's deposition).
109 De Castro v. City of New York, 54 Misc. 2d 1007, 284 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1967); Chester v. Zima, 41 Misc. 2d 676, 246 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1964) (plaintiff required to disclose hospital records when claiming physical injury).
110 See O'Leary v. Sealy, 50 Misc. 2d 658, 271 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1966) where the court stated in dictum that where the complaint alleged that the de-
fendant was subject to epileptic fits and the defendant testified that she blacked out, the
plaintiff could obtain the defendant's hospital records.
111 45 Misc. 2d 757, 257 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965).
n2 29 App. Div. 2d 981, 289 N.YS.2d 667 (2d Dep't 1968).
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